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Crafting IPv4 Packets using Scapy to Implement Network Steganography

Prof. Dr. Shraddha Khonde¹, Rutuja Gaikwad², Pratiksha Chavan³,

Dnyaneshwari Rakshe⁴

Students, Department of Computer Engineering, MES College of Engineering, Pune 1,2,3,4

Abstract: A technique used for hidden communication between two covert parties. It is an art of hidden communication. It also relates to the areas like network protocols and security for practical data hiding in communication networks using Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). Network steganography uses communication protocols such as TCP/IP. Such methods make it harder to detect and eliminate. In a typical steganography using network the modification of a single network protocol occurs. Such modification can be to the Protocol Data Unit. Network steganography shelters a broad spectrum of techniques.

Keywords: Network Protocols, Covert Communication, Storage-based Covert Channel, System Security, Network Security, Steganography, Encryption, TCP/IP, IPv4, Scapy

INTRODUCTION

As every organisation, every person wants to keep information and communication secrete and safe. Steganography is the method to hide data inside cover, that person even cannot detect that this cover or media contain a covert message. Image, audio and video are media to insert a secrete message inside it. But, why not to use the already existing media or a cover to hide a message, here, is technique to hide a message inside a cover which can be the network protocols.

A network protocol is an established set of rules that determine how data is transmitted between different devices in the same network. Network protocols are the reason you can easily communicate with people all over the world, and thus play a critical role in modern digital communications.

To save the extra storage use, we can hide the message inside the network protocol, in its various fields such as option field and identification field. It can be implemented by creating covert channels inside a option field of IP protocol header.

1. IP Protocol

In computer networking internet protocol is a medium or set of rules for routing and addressing packets of particular data for communicating over the internet through packets. Packet is nothing but small pieces of data that going to traverse. The structure of IP packet consists of IP header attached to each packet.

1.1 IP Header

IP header contains all the information like, source IP address, destination IP address, flag, length. It consists of two parts a fix part and a variable part. The fields in the IP header are as follows

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[Image: IP Header]

Figure 1:IP Header

1.2 IP Options

As the name implies, it is not mandatory to use. Hence, this space can be utilized to communicate covertly by inserting a secrete message in this field



Figure 2:IP Option Field Structure

IP Option consists of Type field which is 8 bits long having 3 subfields

- Copy
- Class
- Number
- **1.2** Timestamp Option





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In the timestamp, option type is 68 decimals (i.e., option class = 2 and option number = 4), option length is the number of octets with a maximum of 4, timestamp = a right-justified, 32-bit timestamp. In this project we are using timestamp.

LITERATURE SURVEY

Network steganography is recent steganography technique, while image, audio and video steganography has been favourite topic of researchers. In this section, we have look on previous work and research related to network and protocol steganography.

As per our knowledge based on research, Network steganography has not been that much researched topic. Rowland in [12] suggested the use of IP identification field which is normally used for identifying the fragments of an IPv4 packet. Many other approaches [4][7][8] proposed steganographic method to hide secret message into the identification field of IP packet header. In [4] Punam Bedia, Arti Duab have proposed a network steganography using the overflow field of timestamp option in an IPv4 packet. In [13] stated that, the packet timings are varied in order to create covert channel.

These channels are more complex than storage type covert channel. Wireshark application (Wireshark is a freely available packet analyser tool) [9] at the receiving end. The warning messages are automatically highlighted by Wireshark in yellow. Moreover, if more covert messages like these are sent over the network, the generation of a large number of warning indications can draw the attention of a network administrator about some suspicious communication.

Experimental Setup -

On the LINUX environment, communication setup is between two LAN connected nodes. One is sender and another is receiver. Using the IP address of the receiver, sender sends the covert channel thorough the protocol which is IP protocol.

This implementation method uses **Scapy** which is the Python's networking library used for the network packet manipulation. Using scapy the covert data is added in the timestamp field of timestamp option. While traversing the covert message,

0. Time 169 3.81 170 3.81	Source 9537568 172.16.0.252 9784190 172.16.0.45	Destination 172, 16, 0, 45	Protocol Ler	oth Info			
169 3.81 170 3.81	9537568 172.16.0.252 9784190 172.16.0.45	172.16.0.45		igen mito			
170 3.01	9784190 172.16.0.45		1Pv4	58			
		172.16.0.252	ICMP	82 Parameter problem	(Pointer indicat	es the error)	
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Figure 3:Warning Message by Wireshark (Yellow)

Wireshark (Packet-sniffer) a network protocol analysis application which captures packet from a network connection can identify the unusual patterns or packet content in the traffic like malformed packet. The image Fig.4 shows the warnings showed by the Wireshark while traversing the packet. It is due to overfitting of the packet.

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<u>F</u> ile	<u>E</u> dit <u>V</u> iew <u>G</u> o <u>C</u> apt	ure <u>A</u> nalyze <u>S</u> tatistics	s Telephon <u>y W</u> ireless	s <u>T</u> ools <u>H</u> elp						
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No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length Info					
	4799 54.627902407	172.16.0.252	35.224.170.84	HTTP	153 GET / HTTP/1.1					
	4814 54.864113844	35.224.170.84	172.16.0.252	TCP	66 80 → 39022 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=88 Win=64256 Len=0 TSval=314323	353				
	4815 54.864588741	35.224.170.84	172.16.0.252	HTTP	214 HTTP/1.1 204 No Content					
	4816 54.864605629	172.16.0.252	35.224.170.84	TCP	66 39022 → 80 [ACK] Seq=88 Ack=149 Win=64128 Len=0 TSval=4205	002				
	4817 54.864729850	172.16.0.252	35.224.170.84	TCP	66 39022 → 80 [FIN, ACK] Seq=88 Ack=149 Win=64128 Len=0 TSval	.=42				
	4818 54.865540217	35.224.170.84	172.16.0.252	TCP	66 80 → 39022 [FIN, ACK] Seq=149 Ack=88 Win=64256 Len=0 TSval	.=31				
	4819 54.865559430	172.16.0.252	35.224.170.84	TCP	66 39022 → 80 [ACK] Seq=89 Ack=150 Win=64128 Len=0 TSval=4205	002				
	4850 55.100972628	35.224.170.84	172.16.0.252	TCP	66 80 → 39022 [ACK] Seq=150 Ack=89 Win=64256 Len=0 TSval=3143	233				
	18205 207.191499352	172.16.0.252	172.16.0.45	IPv4	38 70 Destination warestable (Destand) warestable)					
	18200 207.191700875	172.10.0.45	172.10.0.252	ICMP	To Destination unreachable (Protocol unreachable)					
	T ¹ 1 1 1 01									
	Time to live: 64	hu llas Ostias (0)				^				
	Protocol: IPV6 Hop	D-Dy-Hop Option (0)	diaphladl							
	Header checksum o	status: Unverified]	uisabieuj							
	[neader checksum status: unversited]									
	Source: 1/2.10.0.232									
–	Options: (4 bytes)). Time Stamp								
	▼ TP Ontion - Time Stamp (A bytes)									
	▶ Type: 68									
	length: 4									
	Pointer: 107 (points to middle of field)									
	0110 = Overflow: 6									
	0011 = Flag: Time stamps for prespecified addresses (0x3)									
000										
001	00 18 00 01 00 0	00 40 00 71 34 ac	10 00 fc ac 10	····@· q4····	•					
002	0 00 2d 44 04 6b 0	63		-D-kc						
0	Time to live (ip.ttl), 1	byte			Packets: 19933 · Displayed: 24 (0.1%) Profile:	Default				

Figure 4:At sender's side

Here through the sender's node the text data in the byte form is transferred to the receiver

while the receiver can track that data through the Wireshark or Scapy sniffer. The covert data is hidden from the other ordinary user of the Wireshark.

Fig 5 shows the data that is captured by the receiver after successfully traversing the covert message.

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	170 3.019784190	172.16.0.45	172.16.0.252	ICMP	82 Parameter problem	(Pointer indicates the error	r)
	931 32.728078188	172.16.0.252	172.16.0.45	IPv4	38		
	932 32.728314316	172.16.0.45	172.16.0.252	ICMP	70 Destination unreac	hable (Protocol unreachable)	
• D	0110 = Heade ifferentiated Se	r Length: 24 byte rvices Field: 0x0	s (6) 0 (DSCP: CS0, ECN:	Not-ECT)	107		a
T I F T	otal Length: 24 dentification: 0 lags: 0x0000 ime to live: 64	x0001 (1)					
Р Н [S D • 0	rotocol: IPv6 Ho leader checksum: Header checksum ource: 172.16.0. estination: 172. ptions: (4 bytes	p-by-Hop Option (0x7134 [validatio status: Unverifie 252 16.0.45), Time Stamp	0) n disabled] d]				
	 IP Option - Tim 	e Stamp (4 bytes)					*
0000 0010 0020	d8 cb 8a 6d 2d 00 18 00 01 00 00 2d 44 04 6b	<mark>c4</mark> d8 cb 8a 6d 2 00 40 00 71 34 a 63	d 0b 08 00 46 00 c 10 00 fc ac 10	••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••	·F·		
0 2	enp3s0: <live captur<="" td=""><td>e in progress></td><td></td><td></td><td>Packet</td><td>s: 1365 · Displayed: 4 (0.3%)</td><td>Profile: Default</td></live>	e in progress>			Packet	s: 1365 · Displayed: 4 (0.3%)	Profile: Default

Figure 5:At receiver's side

CONCLUSION

This method of network steganography uses timestamp option field instead of other like identification field and using a text data to be traversed avoiding extra efforts to decrypt the data from the bits to text. Without getting caught in the Wireshark the covert data is traversed through the setup system in the view of string. This is the way by which text data is traversed.

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